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In-Store Media and Channel Management 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we study the interesting and complicated effects of retailer in-store media 
on distribution channel relationships. With the help of advanced technology, retailers can 
open in-store media in their stores and allow manufacturers to advertise through the in-
store media. We show that opening in-store media is a strategic decision for a retailer, 
and a retailer may strategically subsidize manufacturers on their advertising through in-
store media to better coordinate the channel. Even when in-store media is more effective 
than commercial media (i.e., radio, TV, newspaper, etc.), a retailer may still charge an 
advertising rate lower than commercial media does. We also show that the benefit of in-
store media to a retailer can be a U-shaped curve of manufacturer bargaining power, and 
a retailer may introduce in-store media only when manufacturer bargaining power is 
either very high or very low, but not intermediate. With manufacturer competition, a 
retailer can strategically use in-store media to ration excessive advertising between 
manufacturers, achieving better channel coordination. When manufacturers are 
asymmetric with pre-advertising brand awareness, a retailer has incentive to subsidize 
manufacturers whose brand awareness is higher. We also find that retailer in-store media 
can benefit social welfare even when in-store media is less effective than commercial 
media. However, if in-store media effectiveness is very low, a retailer may introduce in-
store media for its own benefit with the sacrifice on social welfare. 
 
Keywords: In-store Media, Advertising, Distribution Channel, Channel Coordination, 
Retailing 
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1. Introduction 
One interesting phenomenon in modern retailing practice is that many retailers start to 
open in-store media. With the advent of advanced technology, it is now practical and 
feasible for retailers to offer media platforms and manufacturers to advertise on in-store 
media. Wal-Mart, for instance, launched Wal-Mart TV in 1999 and placed 100,000 
screens in more than 2,650 stores, reaching 336 million shoppers every month. Wal-Mart 
TV attracts many manufacturers including Kraft Foods, Gillette, and Frito-Lay to 
advertise through Wal-Mart TV. According to Forrester Research, Wal-Mart TV has the 
fifth-largest reach of any network, trailing only the big broadcasters ABC, CBS, NBC, 
and Fox (Forrester Research 2005). 
In-store media has also been adopted by diverse retailers including Best Buy, 
Costco, Albertsons, CompUSA, Macy’s, Boarders, and Kroger. Manufacturers pay 
retailers to advertise through in-store media. Importantly, in-store media by retailers may 
not only be for cooperative advertising purposes. For instance, Costco’s in-store network 
is supported entirely by national advertising and marketing dollars rather than co-op or 
trade funds (Forrester Research 2005).  According to Mark C. Mitchell, executive vice 
president for ad sales at Premier Retail Network (PRN), in-store media makes itself very 
attractive as an advertising platform to marketers because up to 70 percent of brand 
decisions are made right inside the store (New York Times 2005). Forrester Research 
reports that in-store media are more effective than commercial media since in-store media 
can provide more relevant ads, be more information-rich, and provide a consistent 
message (Forrester Research 2006). Another example supporting the effectiveness of in-
store media is from Nielsen Media Research which finds brand recall among Wal-Mart 
TV viewers was 65%, a significant improvement over the 23% average recall among in-
home viewers (Thomas 2004). Despite being more effective, in-store media often charge 
advertising rates much lower than commercial media. For instance, while the advertising 
rate is $412k for 30 seconds on Survivor: Vanuatu by CBS, and $620-$650k for 30 
seconds on American Idol by Fox, Wal-Mart TV charges only $50-$300k per four-week 
run (Forrester Research 2005). Although some analysts attribute the low rates for in-store 
media to possibly lower effectiveness of in-store media, retailing managers review in-  3
store media as a significant improvement to current retailing practices because the 
separation of consumer awareness and purchase is removed (Forrester Research 2006).  
In-store media (henceforth abbreviated by ISM) or “retailer-generated media” is 
distinguished from commercial media (CM) like radio, television, Internet, newspaper, or 
magazine because it is operated by the retailer (or a party thereof) rather than by 
independent third parties. This ownership structure means that retailers who use ISM 
profit from the additional ad revenue that otherwise would end up with CM. Furthermore, 
our research illustrates, the retailer stands to benefit further from ISM by the ability to 
manage product sales and competition within its store through its setting of ad prices. 
However, for the retailer, establishing an ISM network requires an upfront investment in 
costly technology. Therefore, it is important for the retailer to identify and evaluate all 
sources of ISM’s benefit when comparing against its costs.  
There are additional managerial issues for a retailer with ISM. Because ISM ads 
affect sales and competition within a category, there are implications for the interaction 
between channel members and the distribution of channel profits. Moreover, this 
interaction may depend on consumers’ predisposition to certain brands in a category. An 
important objective in this research is to investigate how ISM pricing can be used to 
manage product sales in the presence of competition or a new brand in the product 
category. 
The availability of ISM is also a challenge for consumer goods manufacturers who 
traditionally advertise on independent commercial media. For instance, is ISM a good 
thing or a bad thing for these manufacturers? The answer is not obvious, particularly 
against a backdrop of heightened retail leverage over manufacturers (Kadiyali, 
Chintagunta & Vilcassim 2000). Therefore, in this research we evaluate the potential 
tradeoffs to a retail supplier who contemplates the use the retailer’s ISM. 
It has also been observed that the effectiveness of ISM can play a crucial role in 
the launch of new products. For example, more than 150 new products were introduced 
on Wal-Mart TV in the year 2006 (USA Today, March 29, 2007). In fact, Premier Retail 
Network (PRN), the firm that manages ISM for Wal-Mart, Albertsons, and other retailers   4
focuses their efforts on getting new brands to advertise with ISM.
2 Our research suggests 
a rationale for this observation.  
In this paper, we study these issues by focusing on the effects of ISM on the 
distribution channel. Specifically, we address the following questions: When should a 
retailer introduce ISM? What are the effects of ISM on the profits of distribution channel 
members? What factors affect the optimal advertising rate for ISM? How does the 
distribution of channel power (e.g. bargaining power) affect a retailer’s decision on 
establishing ISM, the optimal advertising rate, and firms’ profits? The answers to these 
questions will help shed light on the complicated issues regarding ISM. They also help 
marketing scholars and practitioners to understand the effects of this novel phenomenon. 
To answer the above questions, we set up a simple, but insightful game-
theoretical model of a retailer who establishes ISM as an advertising alternative for its 
suppliers. In the model, we account for the difference in ad effectiveness of ISM and 
commercial media CM. This allows us to set our investigation in the context of declining 
effectiveness of CM advertising to influence purchase decisions. With our model, we can 
offer an explanation for the emergence of ISM and how ISM changes manufacturers’ 
advertising incentives for consumer products. We also incorporate pre-advertising brand 
awareness on ISM pricing, and indicate how retailers should price discriminate across 
competing suppliers whose brands differ. To see the effects of ISM, we study firms’ 
profits and advertising activities before and after ISM is available. We first study the case 
of one manufacturer and one retailer. Later, we extend the model to asses the case of 
competing manufacturers. A number of intriguing results emerge. First, we find that ISM 
can help the channel coordinate on a more optimal level of advertising. In particular, by 
offering  ISM, the channel generates more sales and higher profits for both channel 
members. There are two sources of benefits. One comes from internalizing media 
spending that was once spent on outside media and the other from coordinating the ad 
pricing structure towards the channel optimum. Furthermore, because of these joint 
benefits, it is optimal for the retailer offer discounts on ISM advertising relative to CM 
even if ISM is a more effective advertising medium. 
                                                 
2 Source: PRN promotional video. (Available at www.prn.com.)   5
  Second, we show that a retailer who offers ISM to competing suppliers should 
raise ad prices relative to the single supplier. Interestingly, this is not because of market 
power in advertising but rather that price can be used as a rationing device. By 
internalizing the advertising decision, the retailer raises ad prices in order to mitigate the 
business stealing externality prominent in competitive advertising (e.g. Grossman and 
Sharpiro 1984). This may of course be particularly relevant for undifferentiated products 
on which choices are highly sensitive to advertise messages. 
Third, we show that the level of pre-advertising brand awareness affects the 
efficacy of ISM. For many product categories, consumers may be aware of certain brands 
and not aware of others. Our results suggest counter-intuitively that a retailer who offers 
ISM should set higher ad prices to the supplier with less brand awareness. There are two 
reasons for this. One reason is simply that the marginal benefit of ISM is higher for the 
supplier whose rival is better known by consumers. A second reason for disparate 
pricing, stems from the rationing principle discussed above. For a lesser known brand, its 
advertising is more likely to influence a consumer with knowledge of the well-known 
brand than to generate a new sale. The retailer raises ISM price to ration potentially 
wasteful advertising. This result may be counter to the notion that “starter” brands should 
be offered a discount and may explain the observed push for new products to be 
promoted on ISM. 
Finally, our model offers results concerning ISM and its effect on social welfare. 
Clearly, if ISM is more efficient in its ability to inform consumers, then social welfare is 
unambiguously higher as a result of better advertising means. Interestingly, however, 
even when ISM is less effective than commercial media, a retailer’s use of ISM can still 
increase social welfare. This is due to improved channel coordination from the retailer’s 
subsidization of manufacturer advertising. Such efficiency gains are limited, however. If 
ISM effectiveness is significantly low, a retailer may introduce ISM for its own benefit 
with the sacrifice on social welfare.  
Our paper is related to two streams of research. The first stream is the retail 
distribution and channel management literature. In line with many papers in this literature 
we examine how actions by a channel member serve to coordinate the channel by 
improving overall profits. For example, Jeuland and Shugan (1983), Moorthy (1987), Lal   6
(1990), Ingene and Parry (1995), Gerstner and Hess (1995), Iyer (1998), Desai, 
Koenigsberg, and Purohit (2004), and Raju and Zhang (2005) evaluate the impact of 
various marketing decisions by firms on channel efficiencies. But none of these studies 
suggests how the option of advertising offered by the retailer affects channel 
coordination. There is also a good deal of work investigating the implication of channel 
structure on marketing choices (McGuire and Staelin 1983, Coughlan 1985, Moorthy 
1988, Choi 1991, Purohit 1997, Trivedi 1998). These papers focus on the implication of 
channel structure on wholesale transactions and retail pricing, while taking other 
marketing variables as held constant. In contrast, we examine how the extent of 
competition among suppliers alters the price of the retailer’s ISM service. 
In many respects, ISM resembles a more technical version of in-store displays, 
which has been examined in the marketing literature (Chevalier 1975; Bemmaor and 
Mouchoux 1991). This literature has examined the impact of the use of in-store displays 
on consumer reactions to price and promotion. However, the issue of in-store display as 
an advertising medium for sale and its impact on the supply channel is left unexplored.  
This paper also speaks to the marketing literature on advertising and commercial 
media. Dukes and Gal-Or (2003) and Liu, Putler, and Weinberg (2004) illustrate the 
importance of the structure of the media industry on marketing decisions. Like these 
papers, our paper acknowledges that advertisers have options with respect to ad 
placement. However, neither of these papers is equipped to assess the situation when the 
seller itself – the retailer – owns the advertising medium. Godes, Ofek, and Sarvary 
(2003), on the other hand, looks at competing firms who earn revenue from selling both 
products and advertising space. In that research, the product for sale is media content 
bundled with advertising messages promoting other, independent products. In our setting, 
however, the advertising messages are aimed at promoting the available product sold at 
the retailer.  
Finally, our paper relates to the literature examining the effect of third-party 
advertising on the actions and profits in distribution channels. Shaffer and Zettelmeyer 
(2002, 2004) and Dukes, Gal-Or, and Srinivasan (2006) investigate the impact of 
consumer information on the distribution of channel profits. In those papers, the 
advertising rate and information medium are unspecified. In this paper, however, we   7
endogenize a firm’s choice of media and allow a retailer to open ISM and endogenously 
decide the advertising rate. Doing so allows us to internalize the advertising decision 
within the channel and account for economic incentives left out of previous research. 
Consequently, our results lead to new managerial implications for ad pricing. 
  The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the basic model 
with one manufacturer and one retailer with and without ISM. In Section 3, we study the 
case of competitive manufacturers and the effect of ISM on manufacturer competition and 
then extend the competitive model to examine the impact of pre-advertising brand 
awareness on ISM and channel interaction. Section 4 offers model extensions and 
discussion, and we conclude in Section 5. The appendix contains the technical details and 
proofs omitted from the main text. 
2. Basic Model – A Single Supplier 
In this section we develop a basic model to investigate two issues: (1) what conditions 
lead to ISM being offered by a retailer? and (2) how does ISM affect channel 
coordination? 
  To understand the basic incentives for offering ISM  we consider a retailer 
potentially offering ISM to only one manufacturer, denoted by R and M , respectively. 
Assume a mass of retail customers, normalized to size 1. Each consumer values any 
manufacturer’s product at v, but is a priori uninformed of its existence. Let  [0,1] ϕ∈   be 
the portion of consumers informed of M’s product which depends on the amount of 
advertising by M. The manufacturer can choose to advertise on commercial media (CM) 
or, if available, in-store media (ISM). Specifically, denote 
k Φ  as the advertising volume 
by manufacturer i  on medium  , kC M I S M = . Then, the probability that any given 
consumer becomes aware of the product is a concave and increasing function of total 
advertising volume,  (, )
CM ISM A ϕ =Φ Φ , 
2
2 () 0 kk
AA ∂∂
∂Φ ∂ Φ ≥≥ , , kC M I S M = . To guarantee 
analytic solutions, we assume the following form for A: 
  { } (, ; ) m i n 1 , 2 ( )
CM ISM CM ISM A ϕγ γ =Φ Φ ≡ Φ+ Φ , (1) 
where  0 γ >  is a parameter measuring the effectiveness of ISM relative to CM as a means 
of reaching consumers. We first evaluate equilibria with  1 γ ≥  where in-store media is   8
more effective than commercial media for a given advertisement. Later, we will study the 
case of ineffective ISM relative to CM (1 γ < ). The advertising technology function, A, 
reflects the fact that consumer awareness is a concave function of advertising volume, 
and at some point, additional advertising messages do not increase the likelihood of 
additional purchases.
3  
We assume that the market rate for advertising is  0
CM a >  for the commercial 
media and the ISM advertising rate is 
ISM a  which is endogenously chosen by R. The 
manufacturer may also incur a fixed cost  0 c ≥  for advertising. This cost encompasses 
any nonmedia costs such as agency fees or ad copy development. Of course, some (or 
even most) non-media cost may be fixed with respect to advertising. However, once the 
decision to advertise has been made, these costs will not affect the ad quantity decision. 
The parameter c, thus, reflects any aspect of these costs that depend on the advertising 
volume. Throughout this paper, we focus the analyses on the case of 
CM ac >  where a 
supplier’s advertising decision is more based on advertising rate rather on the fixed cost.
4 
We also assume 
CM va c <+ to focus on the most interesting case the manufacturer does 
not always achieve full market awareness due to high consumer value.
5 We analyze a 
three-stage game. In stage 1, the retailer R decides whether to offer ISM and, if so, at 
what price. In stage 2, the manufacturer M  makes advertising decision – with CM and, if 
available, with ISM. In stage 3, wholesale transactions are negotiated bilaterally between 
R andM . Following stage 3, consumers make their purchases. We assume that all 
purchasing consumers pay their value. This assumption allows us separate out the retail 
pricing decision and focus on the advertising decisions. The price a consumer is willing 
to pay for a given product may, in reality, depend on the amount and type of advertising 
she is exposed to. We will discuss that case in the model extension section.   
                                                 
3 There are alternative specifications possible for A.  Alternatively, for example, the specification 
()1 A e
−Φ Φ=−  is strictly increasing for all  0 Φ > . Such a specification, however, does not permit closed 
form solutions and therefore limits the analysis of ISM. 
4 The same basic results go through when 
CM ca > . However, we do not focus discussion on this case 
because it emphasizes nonmedia advertising costs rather than the trade-off between media.  
5 The same basic results hold if, instead, 
CM va c >+ . In this case the manufacturer may optimally advertise 
to achieve full market awareness even with commercial media.    9
We solve the game using backward induction to guarantee subgame perfection by 
starting with stage 3. In stage 3, the manufacturer negotiates bilaterally for the wholesale 
transaction. We model these negotiations via Nash bargaining. For positive demand 
() D ϕ , the Nash bargaining solution yields a wholesale price wv λ =  paid per unit sold by 
R to M, where  (0,1) λ∈  denotes the “bargaining power” of the manufacturer. (See 
appendix for formal details.) Bargaining is efficient in the sense that the total channel 
profits are maximized over all levels of demand. This is due to the fact that with the 
absence of retail pricing, there are no inefficiencies due to double-marginalization. 
Therefore, bargaining over more complicated contracts, such as two-part tariffs, will not 
lead to more channel profits. This permits us to focus exclusively on the channel 
efficiencies generated from ISM decisions. 
2.1 Commercial Media (CM) 
With a single supplier, demand for M’s product is the probability that a given consumer is 
aware of it:  () D ϕ ϕ = . If R does not offer ISM, then M chooses 
CM Φ  to maximize its 
profits. It will be convenient to formulate M’s advertising problem in terms of a choice ϕ  
by inverting the advertising technology in (1). Thus, M chooses ϕ  to maximize 
2
() () ( )
2
CM
M vD a c
ϕ
ϕλϕ Π= −+. 
The retailer is passive when not offering ISM and earns  ( ) (1 ) ( ) R vD ϕ λϕ Π =− . This 

























.     (2) 
Not surprisingly, the manufacturer will increase advertising on commercial media when 
manufacturer bargaining power increases. This is because as the manufacturer gains more 
of the channel profit, the manufacturer has stronger incentive to increase the product sales 
by advertising more in the commercial media.  
2.2 Retailer In-Store Media (ISM) 
Now suppose R introduces ISM and offers an advertising rate of 
ISM a .  The manufacturer 
can split advertising between two media, CM or ISM. This leads to a cost of   10
() ()
CM CM ISM ISM ca ca +Φ + +Φ . Note, however, that since M views advertising between 
CM and ISM as substitutes, exclusively one medium will be chosen except possibly at 
parametrically knife-edge situations. In fact, with endogenous ISM pricing, as long as  
1 γ ≥  the manufacturer will advertise exclusively on ISM.
6 Therefore, we can specify M’s 
profits to be 
 
2
(; ) ()( )
2
ISM ISM




Π= − +  , 
when using ISM. Then R’s pricing problem is set 
ISM a  to maximize its profits, which we 
denote as  R Π  and formulate as follows: 
()




vD a a λϕ ϕ
γ
−+        ( 3 )  
subject to  
*() a r g m a x (;) M aa ϕ ϕϕ =Π .         ( 4 )    













=− + + =  ∂ 
.    (5) 
The first term in (5) denotes the internalization created by ISM. By offering ISM, R has 
the ability to capture profits that would have otherwise gone to commercial media. But, 
by choice of 
ISM a , the retailer is able to “throttle” advertising from the manufacturer. In 
particular, the first term in (5), which is the marginal affect of ad prices on product sales, 
is negative (
* /0 dd a ϕ < ). Therefore, it is optimal for the retailer to set price below that 
of a monopoly media provider (who would set the bracketed term to zero) in order to 
induce more advertising and product sales. The results when R offers ISM are 
summarized in Table 1 and Proposition 1. 
                                                 
6 In section 4.1, we consider the case when ISM is relatively less effective than CM (i.e.  1 < γ ).   11
PROPOSITION 1 Suppose R offers ISM.  
(i)  ISM leads to uniformly more advertising than CM does: 
* ˆ ()
ISM a ϕ ϕ >  for all 
bargaining power  [0,1] λ∈ .   
(ii)  The retailer will offer a discount relative to CM: 
ISM CM aa <  whenever 
a.   If  2 2
c
vγ λ >−  and 1 γ ≥ , or 
b.  If  2 2
c
vγ λ < −  and 1
CM ac
v λ γ
+ ≤≤ .  
(iii)  Otherwise, if  2 2
c
v γ λ ≤− and
CM ac
v λ γ
+ > , then  
ISM CM aa > . 
 
Table 1: Outcome with one manufacturer using ISM. 
 
The immediate implication of this proposition is that R may set ISM ad rate at or 
below c which is always below the rate at CM, even though ISM advertising is more 
effective than commercial media. For instance, under the conditions in part (ii) of the 
proposition, we always have 
ISM CM aa < . Indeed, the retailer may even be induced to 





v γ λ −<< ), the actual ISM ad price is negative, and the retailer actually subsidizes 
part of the manufacturer’s cost of advertising. It is important to note that even with 




ISM ac c λ
λ − +=  if  2 2
c
vγ λ >−  or 
ISM acv λγ +=  if  2 2
c
vγ λ ≤ − ). The intuition of 
retailer subsidization effect on manufacturer advertising through ISM is as follows. With 
ISM, a retailer’s profit has two sources: product sales and advertising revenue. When 
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λ −    12
revenue by charging a low ISM rate. By doing so, the retailer can motivate the 
manufacturer to advertise more, as indicated in part (i) of the proposition, which in turn 
benefits the retailer from product sales. This motivation is particularly strong with low 
manufacturer bargaining power which implies the retailer retains a significant portion of 
product sales.
7  
Part (iii) of Proposition 1 indicates that under certain conditions, it may be 
possible for the retailer to charge an ISM rate that exceeds the rate in CM market. That is, 
when ISM is very effective (
CM ac
v λ γ
+ > ) relative to CM, then the retailer can command a 
premium for its ability to generate sales for the manufacturer.  Note that despite a higher 
rate, the manufacturer will not deviate to advertise in commercial media since ISM is 
more effective.  
It is useful to evaluate how channel bargaining power affects the advertising rate 
of ISM. When manufacturer bargaining power is high (
2 2
c
vγ λ >− ), as M’s bargaining 
power increases (λ ↑), the optimal ISM ad price increases. When M has a greater share 
of the product margins, the retailer will rely more on the advertising source of revenue 
since the retailer’s share from product sales decreases. In addition, the manufacturer will 
have stronger incentive to advertise since it has a greater share of the product margins. 
Therefore, the retailer will raise ISM ad prices to the manufacturer. The ISM rate 
approximates  c as manufacturer bargaining power λ  approaches unity.
8 Generally, 
while  R enjoys higher ad revenue with higher manufacturer bargaining power, 
Proposition 1 indicates that, overall, R does not benefit from an increase in M’s 
bargaining power. Similarly, with a higher manufacturer bargaining power, the 
manufacturer pays more for advertising, but the benefits of increased share from product 
sales dominates the advertising expenditure increase, resulting in a higher manufacturer 
profit.  
                                                 
7 When the manufacturer bargaining power is sufficiently low (
2 2
c
vγ λ ≤ − ), the retailer will charge a low 
ISM rate (
ISM av c λγ =− ) inducing 
* 1 ϕ =  full market coverage. This boundary solution is a result of the 
fact that the advertising technology function A is not bounded below 1. 
8 When manufacturer bargaining power is low (
2 2
c
vγ λ ≤ − ), the retailer has incentive to keep the 
advertising rate low for the manufacturer to always achieve full market advertising coverage. In this range, 
an increase of manufacturer bargaining power again leads to higher ISM rate since the manufacturer will be 
willing to pay a higher ISM rate.     13
Finally, it is worthwhile to observe the conflicting impact of manufacturer 
bargaining power advertising volume before and after the retailer opens ISM. Recall from 
(2) that before the retailer introduces ISM, the manufacturer will advertise more when 
manufacturer bargaining power increases. Interestingly, however, after the retailer 
introduces  ISM, the manufacturer may advertise less when his bargaining power 
increases. As shown in Table 1, when
2 2
c
vγ λ >− , manufacturer advertising volume 
decreases with a higherλ , which is opposite the directional change than with no ISM. 
The intuition of this contrast is as follows. There are two effects of manufacturer 
bargaining power increase. First, the increase of manufacturer bargaining power has a 
direct effect on the manufacturer’s share of each product sale, which increases his 
incentive to advertise. Second, there is an indirect and negative effect through R’s 
reaction with 
ISM a . As λ  increases, the retailer increases her reliance on advertising and 
uses ad prices to recoup the lost share from product sales. With a higher ISM advertising 
rate, the manufacturer has to lower the advertising volume. Altogether, the negative 
effect dominates and the manufacturer advertises less with more bargaining.
9 It follows 
that channel bargaining power can be a crucial factor in the retailer’s decision to install 
ISM, as we investigate in the next section. 
2.3 Retailer Decision to Open In-Store Media (ISM) 
When will ISM be an equilibrium outcome? Not surprisingly, we find that the 
manufacturer always benefits from ISM since it is more effective than commercial media 
and the retailer has incentive to subsidize manufacturer advertising. The retailer is also 
better off with ISM, provided it covers any fixed cost,  0 f >  of installing it. As we show, 
the bargaining power of the manufacturer affects the retailer’s decision on opening ISM. 
We compare the retailer’s profit before and after implementing ISM, and define 
                                                 
9 It is important to note that the overall negative effect of manufacturer bargaining power on advertising 
volume happens only when manufacturer bargaining power is high (
2 2
c
vγ λ >− ). If the manufacturer 
bargaining power is low (
2 2
c
vγ λ ≤− ), the retailer will charge an ISM advertising rate for the manufacturer 
to always achieve full market coverage, and the advertising volume remains unchanged with manufacturer 
bargaining power.   14
* ˆ () RR R λ ∆≡ Π − Π  as the benefit of ISM relative to CM, gross of fixed cost f. Thus, 
offering ISM will be an equilibrium outcome for any λ  such that  ( ) 0 R f λ ∆ −> . 
Using profit expressions from Table 1 (when 
2 2
c
vγ λ >− ) and (2) it is directly 











++ ≡  . Note that if  4 1
CM a
c γ >−  then 1 λ >   and  ( ) R λ ∆  is strictly 
decreasing in for all λ . Therefore, higher bargaining power for the manufacturer implies 
that it is more likely that ISM will not be offered by R since she is unable to retain enough 
surplus from product sales to cover the cost of installing it. This situation is represented 
in Figure 1, where the dotted line representing  ( ) R λ ∆  is decreasing in λ . If the fixed 
cost,  f, of ISM is such that  (0) (1) RR f ∆> > ∆ (represented by the horizontal line in 
Figure 1), then ISM will be provided in equilibrium for bargaining powers that favor the 
retailer (low λ ). 
 
 








Figure 1: Retailer’s Benefit from opening ISM 
 
However, if  4 1
CM a
c γ <−  then λ  is less than unity, which implies that the retailer’s 
gain from ISM may actually be increasing in the manufacturer’s bargaining power for 
λ λ > . Recall that when R does not offer ISM, her sole source of revenue is through   15
product sales. However, with ISM, she is able to recoup declines in bargaining power in 
part through higher ad prices. This implies that  ˆ
R Π  declines faster in λ λ >  than 
*
R Π . 
This condition holds when the price of advertising on CM, 
CM a , is sufficiently low 
making it a very attractive advertising outlet for the manufacturer. The situation in this 
condition is depicted in Figure 1, where the solid curve representing  ( ) R λ ∆  is U-shaped. 
If the fixed cost, f, of ISM is such that  (1) ( ) RR f λ ∆> > ∆   (represented by the horizontal 
line in Figure 1), then ISM will be provided in equilibrium when channel bargaining 
power is strong – either high or low λ . However, for intermediate levels of bargaining 
power, in the neighborhood of λ , the retailer’s benefit of ISM does not outweigh the 
cost, f, of providing it.
10  
For media and distribution channel management, there are several implications of 
the results just discussed. Specifically, when should a retailer embrace ISM? Although the 
temptation of ISM with the help of advanced technology seems strong, our results 
indicate that a retailer should first examine the channel power before making the decision 
on opening ISM. The ISM may be profitable to a retailer only when the retailer is either 
very weak or very stronger in terms of bargaining position in a channel. This may 
partially explain why power retailers like Wal-Mart, Best Buy, or Kroger have recently 
offered ISM. Our results also show that retailers in a very weak position may benefit from 
establishing ISM. Because they will gain very little from product sales, ISM can provide 
supplemental advertising revenue to retailers. 
3. In-Store Media with Competing Suppliers 
In the previous section we considered the case when the retailer has only one supplier in a 
given product category. We used this model to illustrate the impact of ISM on the 
distribution of channel profits. However, most retailers and, in particular those who use 
ISM, are likely to carry competing brands in many product categories. In this section we 
examine how pricing incentives for ads on ISM are altered in the presence of competition 
between advertising brands. Specifically, we modify the model developed in section 2 to 
see how a retailer adjusts her ad prices on ISM when manufacturers compete for 
                                                 
10 Similar results hold when 
2 2
c
vγ λ ≤− .   16
consumers via their advertising messages. Section 3.1 considers symmetric 
manufacturers and section 3.2 illustrates the implication for pricing when manufacturers 
are asymmetric with respect to pre-advertising brand awareness. 
3.1 The Use of a Competitive Premium 
Consider a model in which there are two consumer product manufacturers,  1 M  and  2 M , 
who sell their products to the common retailer, denoted by R. The basic timing and model 
set-up remain as in the basic model, but we modify consumer choice to reflect competing 







0  12 (1 )(1 ) ϕ ϕ −−   φ   No Purchase 
1  12 (1 ) ϕ ϕ −   { } 1   Product 1 
2  21 (1 ) ϕ ϕ −   { } 2   Product 2 
3  12 ϕϕ   { } 1, 2   Either product with 
equal probability 
Table 2: Characterization of Consumers, Their Information Sets, and Purchase Decisions 
 
With only two manufacturers, we can characterize consumers based on their 
information sets as in Table 2. This formulation implies the following demand for 
product i: 
  1
2 (, ) ( 1 ) 1 , 2 ; ii j i j i j Di j i ϕ ϕϕϕ ϕ ϕ =− + = ≠ . 
The negotiated outcomes in stage 3 lead to, as in the single manufacturer case, a 
wholesale price  i wv λ =  for  1,2 i = . (See appendix.) Hence, we focus on the advertising 
decisions in stage 2. The important distinction with competitive informative advertising is 
the business stealing externality, which leads competing advertisers to engage in too 
much advertising relative to the collusive or the jointly optimal amount. To see this, first 
determine the equilibrium level of advertising in the pure advertising game played by 
manufacturers. Maximizing payoffs   17
2
(, ;) (, )( )
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ii j ii j av D a c
ϕ
ϕϕ λ ϕϕ Π= − +       ( 6 )    










≡==  ++ 
.            
But the jointly optimal advertising level, 
  { } 112 212 1 2 a r g m a x (,; ) (,; ) | aa ϕ ϕ ϕϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ Π+ Π = = ˆ v
ac v
λ
λ ϕ ++ = < .   (7) 
Note from Table 2, that additional advertising by i reaches a Type 3 consumer with 
probability  j ϕ . Therefore, with probability  1
2 j ϕ ,  i’s advertising steals an otherwise 
committed customer of manufacturer j rather than bringing in a new consumer. 
Manufacturer i does not care about this channel loss when maximizing her own profits in 
(6). The maximization in (7) internalizes this loss, and advertising levels are therefore 
lower. The retailer, when setting a price for ISM ads, mitigates these losses.  
  Formally, consider the case when R offers ISM. Then R’s profit from setting its 
ISM price at a  
  () ()
22 ** * *




av D a D a aa λϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
γ
   Π= − + + +     
 
 pricing problem can be formulated as follows: 
max ( ) aR a Π           ( 8 )  
subject to  
**
1 () a r g m a x (, () ;) ii j aa a ϕ ϕϕ ϕ ≤ =Π  for  1,2; ij i = ≠ .     (9) 
















≡==   + 
.      ( 1 0 )  
Required to ensure the existence of an equilibrium solution to the problem defined by (8) 
and (9), the condition 
4 (2 ) 0
c v γ λ λ >− − >  is necessary and sufficient. Without 
significant advertising costs 
c
γ , agents always get net positive benefit from informing 
additional consumers. This condition ensures, therefore, an interior equilibrium such that 
*() ( 0 , 1 )
ISM a ϕ ∈  and 
22 () / 0 R aa ∂Π ∂ <  at 
ISM a .    18
The impact of manufacturer competition on ISM pricing incentives can be seen by 
comparing (5) with the corresponding first order condition: 
()
**
** 2 * 1
2 ( 1 ) 1 () ( () ) 2 () 0
2
R d dd






=− − + + = 

. (11) 
The first term of (11) is smaller than the corresponding term in (5). This is due to fact that 
R internalizes the business stealing externality present when manufacturers used CM. 
This change reflects the incentive for R to induce less advertising via a higher 
ISM a . 
Thus, ISM brings manufacturers closer to the jointly maximized level of advertising. 
Meanwhile, the retailer benefits through higher 




Suppose R offers ISM to competing manufacturers. Then R’s optimal ISM advertising 
rate is larger than when R sells to a single manufacturer. In particular, 
(i)  If  
4 (2 ) 0
c v γ λ λ >− − >  then  
2 32
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(ii)  Otherwise,  1
2
ISM ac v γλ =+  and 
* 1 ϕ = . 
 
  Note from Proposition 1 that, when manufacturer bargaining power is sufficiently 






− , which is the first term of 
ISM a  
stated in the above Proposition 2. Thus, with competing manufacturers, the optimal ISM 




λ −  charged by the retailer. It is important note that 
this competitive premium enjoyed by R is not a result of its relative market power for 
advertising space (two buyers instead of one). Rather, the premium reflects R’s rationing 
of advertising space to mitigate the business stealing externality.  
  Further reflective of the rationing principle discussed above, note that the 
premium is increasing in both the bargaining power parameter,λ , and the relative 
effectiveness of ISM, γ . As either of these increases, as shown in (10), manufacturers are   19
induced to advertise more in a competitive equilibrium, thereby extending the amount of 
business stealing. But, because part of this advertising decision is internalized by R 
through ISM pricing, the retailer optimally increases 
ISM a  to ration excessive advertising. 
  It is important to note that we did not consider the impact of advertising on the 
retailer’s product prices. As is well-known, informative advertising tends to increase the 
price elasticity of demand, thereby stimulating price competition. However, ads on ISM 
focus on “captive” consumers making a choice between the brands while visiting the 
retailer. Consequently, the retailer is able to internalize the otherwise competitive force 
driving prices downward as consumers are better informed through ISM. 
3.2 The Impact of Pre-Advertising Brand Awareness 
In this section we extend the analysis of the competitive model to allow for the possibility 
that certain brands are recognized by consumers even without advertising, while other 
brands are less well-known. For example, consider the possibility that the retailer carries 
an assortment consisting of an established brand along side a new product in the same 
category. By extending the competitive model presented above, we can ask how 
asymmetries in brand awareness affect the incentives for ISM pricing. In particular, we 
evaluate the case in which competing manufacturer’s have different levels of pre-







0  11 22 (1 )(1 ) α ϕα ϕ −− −− φ   No Purchase 
1  11 22 () ( 1 ) α ϕα ϕ +− −   { } 1   Product 1 
2  22 1 1 () ( 1 ) α ϕα ϕ +− −   { } 2   Product 2 
3  1122 () ( ) α ϕα ϕ ++   { } 1, 2   Either product with equal 
probability 
Table 3: Consumer Information with Pre-Advertising Brand Awareness 
 
 Let  (0,1) i α ∈ , 1,2 i =  be the brand awareness parameter, which reflects the extent 
to which consumers are aware of brand i in absence of informative advertising. Then,   20
given advertising levels that correspond to  i ϕ , 1,2 i = , a consumer is aware of product i 
with probability  (0,1) ii α ϕ +∈ . Consumers and their information sets and purchase 
decisions with pre-advertising brand awareness are characterized in Table 3.  
  We assume that the retailer has the ability to set discriminatory prices based on 
pre-advertising brand awareness level. The retailer’s decision in this setting is to choose a 
pair of prices  112 212 ((,) ,(,) ) aa α αα α  to maximize   
*2 *2
11 22 () () ** **
12 11 21 2 11 21 2 1 2 22 (, )( 1 ) [ (, ; , ) (, ; , ) ]
aa
R aa v D D a a




11 2 2 argmax ( , ; , ) ( ) ii j i vD a c
ϕ
ϕ ϕλ ϕ ϕ α α ≤ =− +    1, 2; ij i = ≠ .   (13) 
The analysis of this program leads to the following result. 
 
PROPOSITION 3  
With pre-advertising brand awareness if  ij α α >  then   12 12 (, ) (, )
ISM ISM
ij aa α αα α <  
around the symmetric interior equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 3 reveals the fact that it is optimal for R to charge a higher ISM price 
to the manufacturer with less brand awareness. The intuition is that a manufacturer with 
lower pre-advertising brand awareness has more to benefit from each ISM advertisement. 
The retailer can capture some of this benefit through a higher ad price. Moreover, this 
higher ad price helps to mitigate wastefully duplicative advertising, which is more likely 
to occur from the less well-known brand. This result may be somewhat counter-intuitive 
because it suggests that big-brands be given a discount, rather than be charged a 
premium, for ISM advertising.
11  
There is an additional coordination benefit accruing to the channel as a 
consequence of discriminatory pricing. To see this, suppose that consumers are more 
aware of brand i ( ij α α > ) and the retailer sets a uniform price. Because the lesser known 
brand j has a greater marginal benefit from advertising than the well-known brand i, j 
                                                 
11 This result assumes equal bargaining power across brands. This result is mitigated (or strengthened), 
however, if a manufacturer’s brand awareness was positively (negatively) correlated with bargaining 
power, λ .   21
would advertise more than i. In fact, j will advertise more than is optimal for R because 
with higher  j ϕ , there is a greater chance that the marginal advertisement will result in a 
stolen customer from i rather than generating a new customer. This is inefficient for the 
retailer since a stolen customer does result in an additional sale for R. Similarly, i will 
advertise less than is optimal for R. This suggests that R can improve profits by inducing j 
to advertise less and i to advertise more. This is facilitated by the discriminatory pricing 
suggested in Proposition 3.  
4. Model Extensions and Discussion 
In this section, we discuss extensions of our basic model. First, we study the case that 
ISM is not as effective as CM. Second, we discuss the case when firms pursue persuasive 
advertising rather than informative advertising. 
4.1 Ineffective In-Store Media ( 1 < γ ) and Social Welfare 
When ISM is less effective than commercial media, the retailer may, nevertheless induce 
the manufacturer to exclusively use ISM by keeping the price 
ISM a  sufficiently low. As 
our model indicates, both retailer and manufacturer may stand to benefit from ISM even 
if it is less effective than CM. This has interesting consequences for social welfare, which 
we now explore.  
To illustrate the main point, it is sufficient to focus the discussion on the interior 
equilibrium (i.e. when  γ λ v
c 2 2− > ), but the same basic result holds with full market 
coverage. Note that when  1 < γ , the retailer will face a stronger competitive constraint. 
Recall that manufacturers choose to advertise with ISM as long as the outside option of 
advertising through CM is not better:  c c a a




CM 2 ) (
4 2
+ + − ≡ <
γ λ λ . This condition says that the retailer’s share of the 
channel margin on sales is sufficiently high that it may be profitable to offer a discount 
on ISM advertising, net of its lower effectiveness, in order to generate more revenue   22
through product sales.
12 Hence, we assume that  λ λ γ < < − v
c 2 2  and illustrate that ISM 
may occur in equilibrium, even though it would be socially optimal to not have it.  
Recall that consumer surplus from product sales is fully extracted. Therefore, 
social welfare is measured by the sum of profits to the retailer, the manufacturer, and 
commercial media. The retailer benefits from offering ISM only if its advertising 










+− ≡ < . In this case, ISM is offered 
by the retailer and exclusively used by the manufacturer in equilibrium. The total social 
welfare (sum of profits) is 
c
v
W R M 8
) 4 (
2 2
* * * γ λ −
= Π + Π = .        
In contrast, when ISM is not possible, the retailer earns profits only on product sales and 
the manufacturer optimally uses CM at the market rate of 
CM a . The total social welfare 










CM R M +
− +
= Π + Π + Π =
λ λ
. 
A comparison of these two welfare expressions indicates that  W W ˆ * >  if and only if 
2 2 ) 4 ( ) (
] ) 2 ( 2 [ 4
λ
λ λ γ γ
− +





 . And, since  1 γ γ < <  , we have the possibility that ISM is offered in 
equilibrium to the detriment of social welfare. In particular, if the effectiveness of ISM is 
such that  (,) γ γγ ∈  , introducing ISM is optimal for the retailer, but not socially optimal. 
In this case, the social planner prefers that advertising be done by CM which is 
sufficiently more effective. The retailer, however, can afford to subsidize a relatively 
inefficient advertising medium in order to generate more product sales. Moreover, the 
retailer’s subsidy of advertising is too tempting for the manufacturer to forego. Note 
however, opening ISM is socially beneficial whenever  γ γ  >  even if ISM is less effective 
than CM (1 < γ ). Because the retailer internalizes the benefits of advertising, the value of 
its subsidy in 
ISM a  exceeds the loss of profits to CM. Therefore, even when ISM is less 
                                                 
12 Otherwise, if  λ λ > , then the retailer is subject to set 
ISM a  to match the value offered by CM: 
c c a
CM − + γ ) ( .  The same results go through in this case, but we omit the details.   23
effective that commercial media, ISM can still benefit the society as long as the ISM 
effectiveness is not too low. Figure 2 summarizes these results. 
 
Figure 2: Conditions for Socially Beneficial ISM 
4.2 Persuasive Advertising & Retail Price Setting 
In the model, we assume the role of advertising is informative. In practice, however, it is 
possible that manufacturers use ISM advertising to persuade consumers. Even though we 
assume advertising is informative, our basic model can also permit a persuasive role for 
advertising. In that case, consumer willingness-to-pay can be a function of manufacturer 
advertising volume: ( ) ( ) Vv D ϕ ϕ = where v is the maximum willingness-to-pay and  ( ) D ϕ  
is the function capturing the effect of advertising volume on consumer willingness-to-
pay. With the same cost structure as before, the manufacturer’s profit function will be  
2
2 () () ( )
CM
M vD a c
ϕ
ϕλϕ Π= −+ , which is exactly as in the basic model. Therefore, we 
obtain the same results as in the model with informative advertising.  
At first glance, this similarity may appear to be a direct consequence of our 
treatment of retail prices. Recall that we have abstracted away from retail price setting by 
assuming the retailer’s price is independent of advertising levels. Moreover, the evidence 
from the literature on advertising indicates that informative advertising tends to raise 
consumer’s price elasticity (Kaul & Wittink 1995) and induce fiercer price competition 
(Milyo & Waldfogel 1999). However, in the ISM case, the retailer internalizes the 
competition between advertised brands within her store, thereby softening the distinction 
between the roles of advertising and price. Thus, the parallel result stemming from our 
model is less dependent on our modeling assumption on retail pricing and more a 
consequence of the fact that there is softer inter-brand competition within a store. 
1  γ  γ γ  
ISM is equilibrium 
ISM is socially optimal   24
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we studied the effect of ISM on distribution channel relationships. A retailer 
can introduce ISM to allow manufacturers to advertise in ISM. We examined the effect of 
ISM on advertising rate, advertising volume, and channel member profits. 
  There are quite a few interesting results based on this research. First, we showed 
that after a retailer opens ISM, the retailer may strategically subsidize manufacturer 
advertising by charging an ISM rate lower than commercial media. We showed that this 
is true even when ISM is more effective than commercial media. Interestingly, in some 
situations it may be optimal for a retailer to pay a manufacturer to advertise in ISM. 
Second, we found that with supplier competition, the retailer can increase the advertising 
rate to ration excessive advertising by competing manufacturers, resulting in better 
coordination across channels. Third, when competing manufacturers have different pre-
awareness levels, our results showed that the retailer has incentive to charge a high 
advertising rate to a firm with low pre-awareness rate. Thus, the retailer uses in-store 
media to exploit the benefit of ISM on weak brands and mitigate business stealing effect 
between manufacturers. Fourth, we found that ISM can benefit the society as a whole 
even when ISM is less effective than commercial media. However, when ISM 
effectiveness is very low, a retailer may still introduce ISM for its own benefit with the 
sacrifice on the social welfare. 
We acknowledge our model may not capture all characteristics of the 
phenomenon of in-store media. For instance, in our research, commercial media is 
assumed passive on in-store media. Future research can look at the competition between 
commercial media and in-store media. In addition, competition at the retailer level is 
absent in our model. Additional research may be necessary to evaluate the implications of 
retailer competition on the use of in-store media. We hope our research can inspire our 
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Appendix 
This appendix contains the technical aspects of the paper omitted from the main text. 
Wholesale Negotiations via Nash Bargaining 
Consider bilateral negotiations between the retailer, R and a manufacturer,  i M . Upon 
successful negotiations, the retailer earns  ( ) Ri i i vw D Π =− ∑  and  i M  earns 
i M ii wD Π= . If negotiations lead to disagreement, then payoffs are  ()
i
Rj j vwD









λ λ −− − Π− Π Π − Π  . If  0 i D ≠  then  i wv λ = . Observe that 
bargaining is efficient in the sense that the total channel profits are maximized over 
all levels of demand. This is due to the fact that absence of retail pricing, there are no 
inefficiencies due to double-marginalization. Therefore, bargaining over more 
complicated contracts, such as two-part tariffs, will not lead to more channel profits.  
Proof of Proposition 1 
This proof follows from the maximization of (3) subject to (4).  
Proof of Proposition 2 












         ( 1 4 )  
Substituting (14) and (10) into (11) and solving  ( )/ 0 R da d a Π =  gives the expression 
for  














λλ λ λ λ
λλ
 −+− + + −  Π
=<   −− −−   
.   (15) 
The denominator in condition (15) is always negative for  0
c
γ > , while the numerator 
is positive under Assumption 2. Hence, the second order condition for the retailer’s 
problem  in  (9)  is  satisfied.       Q.E.D.   26
Proof of Proposition 3 
Let  11 2 21 2 ( ( ,) , ( ,) )
ISM ISM aa α αα α  be an interior maximizer of (12) subject to (13) 
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where  
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+ = ,  1, 2 i = . The expression in (16) specifies the marginal derivative of the 
retailer’s profit function in (12) subject to (13). The pair of prices 
11 2 21 2 ( ( ,) , ( ,) )
ISM ISM aa α αα α  must be the solution to  
the system 
11 2 (,) 0
ISM ISM Fa a =          ( 2 1 )  
21 2 (,) 0
ISM ISM Fa a = ,          ( 2 2 )  
which implies that the expression in the first set of curly brackets in (16) is identically 
0.   27
Though we cannot explicitly solve for the above system, we can implicitly solve 
for the directional change of ad prices 
ISM
i a  with respect to  12 (, ) α α . First note that at 
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.   (23) 
Note that if  12 α α = , then  12
ISM ISM a α =   
12 12 12 12
1212







,    (24) 
where the inequality follows from (23). The Implicit Function Theorem implies that 
the derivatives  /
ISM
ij a α ∂∂ ,  ,1 , 2 ij =  are the solutions to the following  
1
11 1 1 11
12 1 2 12
22 2 2 22
12 1 2 12
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     ( 2 5 )  
where all expressions are evaluated at  12 (,)
ISM ISM aa. In particular, the right-hand side 
matrix of partials is expressed 
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for 1,2; ij i =≠ . Note that last additive term in each of these expressions is zero by 
(21) and (22). Hence, the signs of each these partials are determined by the signs of 
the expressions in the corresponding first set of curly brackets. Specifically, using the 
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Furthermore, when  12 α α = , it can be shown (using these expressions for the partial 
derivatives above) that at the symmetric equilibrium,  
12 12









1, 2; ij i = ≠ .      (27) 









ij i j i
FF aF F
Ha a αα α
+ − Ψ> −Ψ< −

  ∂∂   ∂∂ ∂
 =− + − − <     ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂    
 
 	 
  	 
 	 










jj j j j
FF aF F
Ha a αα α
+ − −Ψ< − Ψ>

    ∂∂ ∂∂ ∂
 =− + − − >       ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂    
 
 	 





where the inequalities follow from applying (23), (24), (26), and (27). Therefore, for 
any point 
*2
12 1 2 {( , ) (0,1 ) | } α αϕ α α ∈− =, there exists a neighborhood 
2
012 (, ) ( 0 , 1 ) Nε αα > ⊂  such that  ij α α >  implies  ij aa < . 
            Q . E . D .  
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